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Abstract      
 
This study aims to examine the presence of three well-documented calendar anomalies: The 
January/monthly, turn-of-the-month and day-of-the-week effect. These anomalies refer to systematic 
variations of financial asset returns during certain times of the week, month, or year. Throughout 
decades, these stock return regularities have been considered as decisive counterexamples that deviate 
from efficient market hypothesis due to potential trading strategies that generate abnormal returns 
based on such seasonal variations. 
 
Most explanations on the appearance of calendar anomalies are related to behavioural finance frame- 
work. Thus, investors might base their investment decisions on behavioural characteristics such as 
overconfidence and loss avoidance. However, recent research suggests that seasonal effects are 
disappearing in stock markets. The disappearance of calendar anomalies is a result of market learning, 
and therefore the exploitation of stock return seasonality has become less prominent. Based on the 
market efficiency theory, behavioural anomalies should be arbitraged away in the long run when 
investors begin exploiting them (Fama, 1998). 
 
This thesis aims to examine the behavior of stock return seasonality in six emerging market exchanges 
during the period of January 2005 through December 2020. Since numerous emerging market 
exchanges are open for foreign investors and they have experienced a rapid growth in recent years, the 
interest of observable anomalies is highlighted. The widely popular January/monthly, turn-of-the-
month and day-of-the-week effects are estimated with the commonly used dummy variable regression 
model. In addition, all three are estimated with the GARCH framework by incorporating volatility 
clustering and asymmetric responses of return volatility.  
 
The OLS results show that the turn-of-the-month effect is statistically significant in Prague, Budapest, 
and Malaysian stock exchanges. The effect is also significant based on the GARCH regression results. 
Moreover, based on the OLS results, a weekend effect is found in the Malaysian stock exchange, 
where Friday returns are significantly high, and Monday returns significantly low. Under the GARCH 
framework, a January effect is found only in the Prague stock exchange. This indicates that the 
anomaly has most likely disappeared. Furthermore, the GARCH regression results exhibit positive 
Monday effects for Prague, Warsaw, and Johannesburg exchanges. Thus, the mixed results of the 
January/monthly effect and the day-of-the-effect indicate that they are sensible to the choice of error 
distribution, and generalizations of their existence cannot be made. However, the asymmetric GARCH 
models exhibit similar results by accounting the volatility dynamics to a greater extend. Thus, 
seasonality in the examined emerging market returns is present.  
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Conventional finance theory assumes that financial markets are complete and efficient. 
It suggests that investors are conscious of the fundamental value of an asset, and all 
the available and existing information reflects the price of an asset. According to the 
original theory, an individual or an institutional investor makes investments decisions 
rationally and thus does not allow various psychological factors to affect investment 
decisions. The investment activities of a rational investor are guided by her own 
preferences and the goal of an investment is to maximize profits.  
Multiple inefficiencies and distortions in asset prices have been found that the 
conventional theory cannot explain. Investors have been driven by their emotions and 
other psychological factors and might not act rationally. As a result, the foundation of 
behavioural finance has provided explanations for irrational investment behaviour. 
The behavioural theory seeks to provide more humane interpretations of market and 
investor behaviour that the traditional financial theory cannot explain with rational 
assumptions.  
Many financial and economic variables seem to have periods where the behavior of 
the series changes quite dramatically compared to previous observations. The behavior 
of series may change over time to its average value, volatility, or the extent to which 
the current value relates to its past value. The transformation of the behavior in a series 
might be permanent, meaning that a “structural break” occurs, or the change might be 
temporal as the series returns to its previous behavior. In the context of financial 
markets, seasonal effects have been widely studied. It has often been documented that 
some financial variables regularly exhibit different values for some periods than 
others. Especially in equity markets, the turn-of-the-month effect, the 
January/Monthly effect and the day-of-the-week effect are well-documented calendar 
effects or calendar anomalies. (Brooks, 2019, p.447-449.)  
According to Van der Sar (2003), the lack of rational investors is causing calendar 
anomalies because fundamental factors are not the basis for investment decisions but 
simple valuation methods or other irrelevant factors. Thus, it is essential to understand 
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these reasons for justifying the observed patterns and making predictions of market 
movements. (Van der Sar, 2003.) 
This thesis aims to examine three widespread calendar effects that have been widely 
studied over a long period. The effects are the January effect, turn-of-the-month effect, 
and day-of-the-week effect. Recently, researchers have found that many calendar 
anomalies have disappeared (Cochrane, 1999, Marquerin et al., 2006, Shanaev & 
Ghimire, 2021). However, much research supporting the existence of calendar 
anomalies has been published mainly for emerging markets (Patel, 2016, Volkan, 
Kayacetin & Lekpek, 2016, Chiah & Zhong, 2019). Furthermore, since most recent 
financial studies employ the framework of volatility modelling, this thesis uses similar 
techniques to enhance the adequacy of results. Thus, the significant differences in 
returns on different periods may be attributable to time-varying volatility. 
Although the topic of stock market anomalies has been extensively studied in 
developed markets, the subject has recently received a lot of attention in emerging 
markets. Many emerging markets have different trading structures, and they might not 
observe the same trading days or religious holidays as many developed markets. 
According to Harvey (1995), the dynamics of emerging markets differ substantially 
from developed markets in terms of expected returns and volatility. The high 
autocorrelation of stock returns induces part of the predictability of emerging market 
returns. The low asset diversification of emerging market indices can cause serial 
correlation in the index returns. (Harvey, 1995.)  
Furthermore, volatility in emerging markets depends on many different factors. In 
fully integrated markets, global factors strongly impact volatility, whereas local 
aspects significantly impact volatility in segmented markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 
1997). Due to these structural differences, it will be interesting to see if any of the three 
calendar anomalies examined in this thesis occur in individual emerging markets. Re-
examination of calendar effects in emerging markets is essential, as their data are 
studied less frequently and constantly developing. 
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This thesis is constructed as follows: Section 1 introduces the topic. In the second 
section, market efficiency and random walk theories are discussed. Section 3 accounts 
for issues of behavioural finance and modifications for market efficiency theories. 
Section 4 introduces calendar anomalies, such as the January effect, Turn-of-the-
month effect, and Day-of-the-week effect. Section 5 introduces the empirical part of 
the thesis, presenting the data and methods which are conducted to obtain the results 
in chapter 6. Empirical results are analyzed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis 
by presenting results and possible explanations based on the empirical results 













2 MARKET EFFICIENCY  
The concept of efficient markets and return predictability was initially introduced in 
1900, when mathematician Louis Bachelier published his book The Theory of 
Speculation. This book was the first of its kind to explain how the stock market works 
in general. According to Bachelier’s study, security prices are unpredictable because 
historical, present, or even discounted current events do not affect changes in stock 
prices. In the study, Bachelier argues that probability of a change in market prices, 
either up or down, is identical. Stock prices change when there is an incentive in the 
market to change their prices, but no one can predict in which direction the price 
changes move as the probabilities are identical. (Bernstein, 1993.) 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) means that all market information is included in 
the price of the securities. Thus, any information that could be used in stock return 
prediction should already be reflected in stock prices. When there is any information 
implying that a stock is priced with a discount and therefore offers an opportunity for 
profits, investors tend to buy that stock and instantly bid up the price to a correct level. 
Expected returns rates are commensurate with the risk of the stock. (Fama, 1970, 
Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2018, p.334).   
According to Fama (1970), certain conditions are needed for an efficient market to 
succeed. Firstly, it is assumed that in an efficient market, there are no brokerage fees. 
The second assumption is that all market information is available for free to each party. 
The last assumption is that each market participant should have the same expectation 
on the current and future values of stock prices. The market is efficient, should these 
assumptions hold. (Fama, 1970).   
The efficient market hypothesis is divided into three versions according to how well 
security prices reflect different types of information. The various forms of market 
efficiency are weak, semi-strong, and strong, ranging from the most inefficient to the 
most efficient. In the transition from weak to strong form, security prices always reflect 
information more versatile and efficient than in the previous form. The extent 
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determines market efficiency to the information prevailing in the financial markets is 
priced in the securities. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2018, p.337.)  
Based on the weak-form hypothesis, security prices reflect information, such as 
historical price data, trading volume, or short interest. Thus, investors cannot use 
technical analysis to predict future stock prices and achieve abnormal returns. The 
weak-form hypothesis states that there are no patterns in stock price series, indicating 
that future price fluctuations are not determined by price series information. However, 
negative, and positive correlations have been documented for changes in stock returns 
between consecutive days to a small extent. Still, these observations are not considered 
highly significant in both statistical and economic sense. Thus, there is no strong 
evidence of long-term correlations of past stock returns. (Fama, 1970.)  
Early tests of weak form conditions observe trends in stock prices by measuring the 
serial correlations of returns in stock markets. Serial correlation implies the tendency 
in which current stock returns are related to previous returns. If the serial correlation 
is positive, then positive returns generally follow positive returns (momentum). 
Negative serial correlation refers to a phenomenon in which positive returns are 
generally followed by negative returns (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2018, p.349). Weekly 
returns of NYSE stocks have been studied by Conrad and Kaul (1988) and Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988), in which the findings suggest a positive serial correlation over 
short periods. However, the correlation coefficients seem to be relatively small, 
indicating no apparent trading opportunities as they demonstrate weak price trends 
over short horizons (Lo and MacKinlay 1988; Conrad and Kaul 1988).  
The semi-strong form hypothesis asserts that stock prices should already reflect all 
publicly available information regarding companies’ information. In addition to 
historical data, information includes, for instance: quality of management, forecasted 
earnings, balance sheet composition, patents held, and accounting principles (Bodie, 
Kane & Marcus, 2018, p.338). Thus, it is impossible to earn excess returns by utilizing 
fundamental analysis, as all information is already included in the stock price. 
Researchers have studied the semi-strong of the efficient market hypothesis by 
measuring how quickly stock prices respond to different types of news regarding 
earnings and dividend announcements. Fama (1970) studies hundreds of stock splits 
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over thirty years and finds stock prices increasing immediately after splits 
announcements. Thus, the market interpreted splitting as a positive sign, as 71,5 
percent of companies that announced a stock split later raised their dividends more 
than the New York Stock Exchange on average (Fama, 1970).  
The strong-form hypothesis states that all relevant firm-specific information, even 
inside information, is reflected in stock prices. This kind of information is only 
available to a particular investor or group of investors. Corporate managers or insiders 
may have access to information that is not available to the public and could earn excess 
returns by trading on that information. Financial regulations and most of the activities 
of regulatory authorities aim to constrain insider trading. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 
2018, p.338.) 
According to Finnerty (1976), the strong-form conditions can be tested by examining 
how the returns of investors who have access to inside information differ from 
investors who do not have access to inside information. Investors with monopolistic 
information usually earn higher than average returns. Thus, contrary to theory, it is 
possible for investors with inside information to beat the market by taking advantage 
of their broader knowledge of the market, in which case the market is not efficient. 
Insider information has an impact on the entire market when other investors follow 
investors who exploit insider information. (Finnerty, 1976.)  
According to Lo (2004), prices, probabilities, and preferences constitute the “three P’s 
of total investment management,” generalizing the current EMH paradigm. The 
origins of the three P’s come from the fundamental doctrines of economic theory, 
demand, and supply. An “equilibrium” is defined as the intersection of these two 
curves representing a price-quantity pair that simultaneously satisfies both consumers 
and producers. The demand curve forms the aggregation of many consumers’ wishes, 
each derived from the optimization of consumer’s preferences subject to a budget 
constraint that depends on income and prices. Equivalently, the supply curve is the 
aggregation of many producers’ quantities, each derived from the optimization of 
entrepreneur’s preferences subject to a resource constraint that depends on prices and 
costs of manufacturing. In addition, probabilities affect both producers and consumers 
as they make their production and consumption plans over time under uncertain 
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conditions. In the context of financial economics, many formal models of asset pricing 
have been developed, which all show how a “general equilibrium” has been 
determined by the three P’s. (Lo, 2004.)  
2.2 Random Walk Hypothesis 
The theory of random walks in stock prices has a long history and perhaps the earliest 
well-known paper was published in 1953 by Maurice Kendall. Afterwards, the random 
walk hypothesis has been tested in numerous studies and its theory has been reformed 
by many academics. Kendall (1953) observed that no predictable patterns can be made 
on stock prices as they move randomly. This implies that future price changes of a 
security do not depend in any way on its previous price changes. (Fama, 1965). Fama 
(1995) argues that the random walk hypothesis is strongly related to an efficient market 
in which numerous rational investors seek to predict the prices of individual securities 
in the future. Because current information in the market is almost freely available to 
all, competition between many investors causes securities prices to reflect the effects 
of current and past information at any given time. (Fama, 1995.)  
Studies from Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1987), and Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988) have revealed that stock returns comprise predictable components. 
Thus, the behaviour of stock returns is not entirely random. For instance, Keim and 
Stambaugh (1986) show that predetermined variables representing bond and stock 
prices can predict stock prices of different firm sizes and bonds with different 
maturities. Fama and French (1987) discover significantly negative autocorrelation in 
extended holding-period returns, indicating that the variation of long holding-period 
returns is predictable from previous returns.  Lo and MacKinlay (1988) apply the logic 
of variance scaling to test the random walk hypothesis by proposing a variance ratio 
test. The authors reject the hypothesis of random walks in weekly stock returns and 
conclude that time-varying risk and infrequent trading cannot completely explain the 
rejections. In contrast to the findings of Fama and French (1988), Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) report positive autocorrelation for extended holding-period returns.  
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The random walk hypothesis has also been studied in emerging markets. For instance, 
Smith and Ryoo (2003) report significant autocorrelation in the returns of four 
markets: Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Portugal. The hypothesis that stock returns 
follow a random walk is not rejected in Turkey, the Istanbul stock market. The most 
important factor that seems to have effective power to random walks is liquidity since 
liquidity is much greater on the Istanbul stock market than in any other markets in the 
sample. In addition, the price formation process is more active in Istanbul than in other 
markets in the sample, indicating weak-form efficiency. (Smith & Ryoo, 2003.) 
Moreover, Al-Khazali, K.Ding, and Pyun (2007) revisit the empirical validity of the 
random walk hypothesis and document that stock returns in North Africa and the 
Middle East follow random walk procedure after adjusting the data for infrequent 
trading. Thus, these results indicate different implications of infrequent trading 










3 BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 
Traditional finance theory does not consider how people operate and make decisions 
in the real world. Investors make complex decisions in financial markets, and the 
behavior is not always rational. Investors' information process is not always correct, 
and therefore they make erroneous conclusions about the probability distribution of 
expected returns. In addition, investors often make inconsistent or systematically 
suboptimal decisions, even if they know the probability distribution of stock returns. 
The presence of irrational investors in the market does not mean that the market must 
be inefficient. According to the efficient market hypothesis, arbitrageurs take 
advantage of irrational investors' opportunities and drive prices back to their correct 
level. Thus, behavioral finance criticizes traditional finance theory because arbitrage 
possibilities are limited and involve risk. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2018, p.389.)   
3.1 Behavioral biases 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) show that people tend to emphasize recent experience 
compared to previous beliefs when making predictions. Generally, predictions are too 
extreme given the uncertainty associated with their current information. DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990) suggest that overly extreme earnings expectations can explain the Price-
to-earnings (P/E) effect. In this sense, when predictions of a company’s earnings in the 
future are high, perhaps due to recent good performance, they are usually too high 
compared to objective views about the company. This might lead to a high initial P/E 
and subsequent underperformance when investors realize their mistakes. Therefore, 
companies with high P/E multiplies may be bad investments. (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1974, DeBondt and Thaler.)  
Overconfidence relates to a behavior in which people tend to overestimate their 
abilities in forming forecasts. Barber and Odean (2001) study men’s and women’s 
trading activity and average returns in their brokerage accounts. The findings suggest 
that active trading is done far more by men than women. The results also indicate that 
active trading leads to bad investment performance. The average return of the largest 
quintile of accounts classified by portfolio turnover is 7 % lower than the lowest 
quintile by turnover rate. In corporate finance studies, overconfidence seems to exist 
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strongly among CEOs. For instance, Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue that CEOs 
with high overconfidence are more likely to pay too much for target companies when 
making mergers and acquisitions. (Barber & Odean, 2001, Malmendier and Tate, 
2008.) 
The representativeness bias implies that investors generally do not consider the sample 
size because a small sample only represents a large population. Therefore, they can 
deduce the model too quickly from a small selection and extrapolate the apparent 
trends too far into the future. It is easy to see how much such a model would be 
consistent with overreaction and correction deviations. An excellent short-term 
earnings report or a high share price would lead such investors to revise their estimates 
of likely future developments and thus create buying pressures that exaggerate price 
increases. In the end, the gap between the market price and intrinsic value becomes 
noticeable, and the market revises the price to its correct level. In turn, stocks that had 
performed well recently suffer from disclosure within just a few days of earning 
announcements, suggesting that the correction occurs just when investors learned that 
their initial beliefs were too extreme. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2018, p.391.) 
Even though information processing was idealistic, numerous studies show that people 
tend to make less than entirely rational decisions with that information. These 
behavioral biases have a significant impact on the framing of investors’ questions 
about risk-return trade-offs. The framing of choices seems to influence decisions. 
Individuals can be risk-averse when facing choices that involve gains but risk-seeking 
with options that include losses. However, the framing of gains and losses can be 
arbitrary in many cases. A specific form of framing is mental accounting, in which 
individuals segregate decisions. For example, an investor may open an investment 
account in which she invests very conservatively by raising funds for her children’s 
education. At the same time, she may have another account in which she makes very 
risky investments, by seeking quick profits. (Thaler, 1999, Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 
2018, 391.)  
Regret avoidance reflects individuals’ reluctance to suffer losses from unconventional 
investment decisions. For example, the losses that occurred on an unknown start-up 
firm are more painful than similar losses on a portfolio that consists of blue-chip 
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stocks. According to DeBondt and Thaler (1987), the size and book-to-market effect 
relate to regret avoidance since firms with higher book-to-market ratios tend to have 
depressed stock prices. This effect is also consistent with mental accounting when 
investors focus more on the gains or losses of individual stocks rather than on broadly 
diversified portfolios. As a result, they become risk-averse considering stocks with 
recent bad performance, use a higher rate at discounted cash flows, and create a risk 
premium for value stocks. (DeBondt & Thaler, 1987, Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2018, 
392.)  
Perhaps the most well-known behavioral bias is the prospect theory developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In the conventional utility function, utility depends on 
wealth and increases at a diminishing rate as wealth increases. On the other hand, in 
the utility function under prospect theory, utility depends on the changes in wealth 
from current levels. Thus, the utility curve is convex to the left of zero (denotes no 
change from current wealth) rather than concave. While many conventional utility 
functions relate to investors’ decreased risk aversion due to increased wealth, the 
prospect theory always focuses on current wealth, which precludes a reduction in such 
risk aversion and perhaps helps explain high average historical equity premiums. 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2018, 393.)  
3.2 Limits to Arbitrage 
The first condition of the EMH relates to a situation in which investors are assumed to 
be rational and evaluate their investments based on the mean and variance. The EMH 
does not require rationality on all investors; for instance, irrationality is permitted if 
irrational investors' trading activities do not correlate with each other. In such cases, 
the actions taken by irrational investors tend to cancel each other out, and market prices 
are unaffected. Suppose the trading by irrational investors is correlated. In that case, 
the third condition/assumption of EMH states that rational investors will practice 
arbitrage (i.e., earn a risk-free profit) and correct the prices in the process. It is assumed 
that due to the actions of irrational investors, the price of a particular stock will rise 
above its true fundamental value, making the stock a bad investment target when its 
price exceeds its future risk-adjusted net present value. As a result, rational investors 
take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity by selling or even short selling the 
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overpriced stock, and at the time, buying a similar but correctly priced stock as a 
replacement investment. (Shleifer, 2000, p.1-4.) 
According to Shleifer (2000), behavioral finance theory has challenged the efficient 
market hypothesis and its conditions with both theoretical and empirical evidence. 
Many investors form their expectations about returns based on irrelevant information. 
If the efficient market hypothesis were based solely on individual investors' rationality, 
psychological evidence could already reject the theory. Under the second condition, 
however, the view allows an approach from rationality as long the actions of irrational 
investors are random, and thus their effects cancel each other out. Psychological 
evidence shows that similar factors drive investors' deviations, and they tend to cluster. 
(Shleifer, 2000, p.10-12.) 
The third condition of the efficient market hypothesis is based on the possibility of 
arbitrage by rational investors and how their actions correct the price distortions caused 
by irrational investors. For an arbitrage opportunity, substitution stocks should be 
available in the market for stocks whose prices have the potential to have a noise 
trading effect and are therefore mispriced. Although a lot of trading is required for 
discovering arbitrage, for some derivatives such as options and futures, close 
substitutes are available. Typically, for example, the S&P 500 index futures’ prices are 
set close to the value of the underlying stocks, because if there is much deviation 
between the future price and the price of the underlying asset, an arbitrageur could take 
advantage by purchasing whichever is cheaper and selling against it whichever is more 
expensive. In addition, if one could find a substitute asset, the pricing error may worsen 
before it disappears. Consequently, the arbitrageur will suffer temporary losses due to 
margin requirements in leveraged trades. (Shleifer, 2000, p.13.) 
One crucial factor associated with limits to arbitrage is the fundamental risk. Assume 
that a stock is priced below its intrinsic value. Purchasing might offer an opportunity 
to make a profit, but it still includes risk since the undervalued stock may lower further. 
Even though the price should bounce back to its intrinsic value, this might occur only 
after the investor’s investment horizon. For instance, the investor may manage a 
portfolio in a mutual fund, and if the fund is underperforming, the investor might lose 
clients. Thus, the fundamental risk associated with exploiting specific profit 
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opportunities is likely to limit the activity of traders in financial markets. (Schleifer & 
Summers 1990, Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2018, p.394.)  
3.3 Adaptive Market Hypothesis 
Andrew Lo (2004) introduces a new framework for market efficiency by applying 
theories of behavioral science. This perspective highlights principles of evolution, 
such as competition, adaption, and natural selection in financial interactions. 
According to Lo (2004), there are intersections between behavioral biases and the 
evolutionary model. People adapt to a changing environment using heuristics, which 
are approaches to solving various problems based on people’s assumptions and 
experiences from a pragmatic perspective. (Lo, 2004.) 
The critical theory of the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) is that market efficiency 
is dynamic and dependent on the context. Thus, the degree of market efficiency is 
affected by environmental factors, such as the number of market participants and their 
adaptability, competition, and the magnitude of available profit opportunities. If 
several market participants compete for relatively scarce resources within a single 
market, then it is likely for that market to be highly efficient. By contrast, if a small 
number of market participants are competing for relatively abundant resources, it is 
expected for that market to be less efficient.  (Lo, 2004.)  
The AMH has several implications caused by innovation and competition between 
individuals as they learn from mistakes and adapt to the environment. Firstly, the stock 
market environment and demographics of investors induce varying risk premiums over 
time. Secondly, as arbitrage opportunities are discovered and exploited, the market 
environment does not directly move to a higher degree of efficiency despite that the 
arbitrage opportunities disappear. The AMH implies that new profit opportunities are 
constantly generated due to complex market dynamics such as trends, bubbles, panics, 
and crashes. Thirdly, investment strategies such as exploiting calendar anomalies 
might weaken for a time but revive once environmental conditions become more 
feasible to such strategy. (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2014.)    
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4 CALENDAR ANOMALIES 
Calendar anomalies have been well-observed phenomena in academic research in 
finance. For instance, the January, day-of-the-week, and turn-of-the-month effects are 
widely studied calendar anomalies (Thaler, 1987a). These anomalies are defined as 
seasonal patterns at specific periods as they tend to show significantly positive or 
negative stock returns on a day, week, month, or year. Therefore, calendar anomalies 
may provide profitable trading strategies. However, recent research shows that 
abnormal returns generated by exploiting calendar anomalies are disappearing in 
developed markets (Shanaev & Ghimire, 2021; Marquering et al., 2016). Based on the 
weak-form EMH and market learning theory, behavioral market anomalies decay in 
the long-term as investors become more aware of them and begin to take advantage of 
them (Fama, 1998, Timmerman & Granger, 2004). Nevertheless, many researchers 
still suggest that calendar anomalies may be present for a short period, but the 
significance of the anomalies varies highly between different stock markets. 
4.1 January/Monthly effect 
Evidence against the random walk behavior has been documented with a so-called 
January effect, in which stock prices tend to increase from December to January 
(Wachtel, 1942; Rozeff & Kinney, 1976; Keim, 1983; Reinganum, 1983). Commonly, 
the effect occurs since investors are incentivized to sell their loss-making stocks in 
December to reduce their tax liability by deducting capital losses from other capital 
gains.  
Sidney B. Wachtel (1942) is the first to observe the January effect when studying the 
price development of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1927 through 1942. 
Wachtel’s findings indicate an apparent rise in the index as the year turns from 
December to January. He finds that the value of the index rises significantly from 
December to January. Wachtel suggests the tax-loss selling hypothesis as an 
explanation for the January effect. It relates to investor behavior, in which investors 
sell their loss-making stocks at the end of the year, which will result in the prices of 
those stocks decreasing. At the turn of the year, the sale of the loss-making stocks ends, 
as the tax benefits have already been earned through the December stock sale. Thus, 
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the January excess returns occur since the market returns to its normal state. (Wachtel, 
1942.) 
Rozeff and Kinney (1976) exploit Wachtel’s findings to study stock market seasonality 
in the US. The authors examine monthly returns of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) equal-weighted index from 1904 through 1974. The authors detect 
statistically significant higher average returns in January relative to other months 
except from 1929 to 1940. The higher return in January can be explained by new 
information that firms typically provide at the end of the year. Based on this news, 
investors will sell and buy their stocks according to the information. In January, the 
reports regarding companies’ financial earnings are often published, providing even 
more information for investors to respond. (Rozeff & Kinney, 1976.)  
Keim (1983) examines the relationship between firm size and the January effect using 
NYSE and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1963 through 1979 as data 
samples. Keim’s (1983) findings suggest that the distributions of daily abnormal 
returns in January have more prominent means than the other eleven months. In 
addition, Keim (1983) argues that there is a negative relation between abnormal returns 
and size, and it is more precise in January than in other months. In other words, small-
capitalization firms are more likely to generate abnormal returns than large-
capitalization firms. This phenomenon is evident even in years when, on average, 
larger firms generate higher risk-adjusted profits than small firms. Throughout 1963 
through 1979, nearly fifty percent of the average magnitude of the “size effect” is due 
to abnormal returns in January. Moreover, more than fifty percent of the premium in 
January is due to significant abnormal returns occurring at the first trading week of the 
year, especially during the first trading day. (Keim, 1983.)  
Reinganum (1983) detects similar findings regarding the relationship between small-
capitalization firms and significant excess returns in January. Exceptionally high 
returns in January and during the first trading days of January are generated by small 
firms. Based on the empirical findings, the abnormally high returns observed in early 
January appear to be due to tax-loss selling. Nevertheless, the January effect cannot be 
explained entirely by the tax-loss selling hypothesis. (Reinganum, 1983.)  
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Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) examine the seasonality of stock markets in large 
industrialized countries throughout January 1959 through December 1979. The 
authors find evidence that stock market returns fluctuate sharply during different 
seasons in most capital markets around the world. In most countries, 
disproportionately high January returns appear to cause seasonal fluctuations, and 
April returns seem to cause similar effects in the UK. The tax year in the UK begins 
in April and ends in March. Thus, the tax-loss selling hypothesis has explanatory 
power concerning the April effect in the UK. The authors use Capital International 
Perspective (CIP) data, providing end-of-the-month prices of the value-weighted 
indices in local currency. Although there appear to be significantly high average 
returns at the turn of the year, the authors conclude that size-related anomaly is not 
related to these calendar effects. (Gultekin & Gultekin, 1983.) 
Although the tax-loss selling hypothesis has been considered a significant factor in 
explaining the January effect, international evidence reveals that tax-loss selling 
cannot be the only explanation. Non-citizens trading in countries with no capital gains 
tax or different tax years and are subject to January-based taxes could explain the 
January effect in these countries, but little evidence supports this argument. Moreover, 
research has found evidence that Japanese and US stock prices are slightly correlated, 
which undermines the arguments of tax-loss selling substantially. Nonetheless, returns 
at the beginning of the tax year in many stock markets are high, so taxes have some 
effect. (Thaler, 1987a.) 
Another necessary explanation for the January effect is the insider-
trading/information-release hypothesis. The mechanism related to this hypothesis is 
that, as most firms’ fiscal year starts on January 1 and ends on December 31, 
management will receive non-public information at the beginning of January. Some 
managers may use this information to invest in which investors on the other side of the 
transaction experience losses, on average. Therefore, these investors require a higher 
rate of return to protect themselves, which causes the January effect. However, the 
insider-trading/information-release hypothesis does not predict the observed pattern 
that small firms that have experienced price declines in the past have more significant 
returns in January than other firms, on average. (Ritter, 1988.) 
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Ritter (1988) suggests that individual investors' buying and selling behavior is the 
cause of the January effect. Part of the sales proceeds will not be reinvested 
immediately because the securities are realized for tax purposes at the end of the year. 
Still, it will instead be "parked" until January. The reinvestment of these funds thus 
raises the price of small firms, which individual investors typically invest in. For 
institutional investors, there are no incentives to be involved in investment activities 
based on tax-motivated purchasing and selling. (Ritter, 1988.)  
Ritter (1988) examines individual investors' buying and selling behavior at the turn of 
the year by making a unique set of data that includes the daily buy/sell ratios of the 
clients of the cash accounts of the largest brokerage firms in the US. The analysis 
consists of daily returns from CRSP prices of the fifteen turn-of-the-year periods from 
December 1970 through December 1985. The main findings indicate that with the 
utilization of individual investors' buy/sell ratio, the net selling in December abruptly 
shifts to net buying at the turn of the year. The behavior of the buy/sell ratios is 
consistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis and the small firm effect, in which 
individual investors realize losses for tax purposes by selling stock that has decreased 
in price during December. However, reinvestment does not happen immediately; 
instead, investors wait until January, when they invest in a wide range of small stocks. 
(Ritter, 1988.)  
Haugen and Jorion (1996) find similar empirical results on the relationship between 
the January effect and small firm returns. They argue that the price disturbance at the 
end of the year of small stocks is arguably the most well-known anomaly documented 
in the stock market during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the authors show that the 
magnitude of the effect has not changed significantly, and no remarkable trend 
indicates its final disappearance. The authors examine all stocks of the NYSE in the 
CRSP monthly data file from 1926 through 1993 by ranking the stocks based on total 
capitalization. The time series regressions show that small firms, based on size deciles, 
have a more substantial impact on the January effect than large-capitalization firms. 
(Haugen and Jorion, 1996.) 
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Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) argue that the January effect cannot be exploitable due 
to higher transaction costs of small, low-priced stocks. According to the authors, 
higher transaction costs and bid-ask bias potentially explain the failure of informed 
investors to eliminate significant before-transaction-cost excess returns in January. 
Therefore, the January effect is not likely to be an ongoing and exploitable trading 
strategy. (Bhardwaj and Brooks,1992.) 
By contrast, according to Haugen and Jorion (1996), individual investors can exploit 
the January effect as a trading strategy through mutual funds. The marginal cost of 
trading resulting from the transition of mutual funds from the money market account 
to the small-cap stock account at the end of the year is unlikely to prevent such 
companies from taking advantage of the January effect. This is because transaction 
costs are shared with all mutual fund participants. Market neutrality can be achieved 
by taking long positions in approximately equally weighted or small stock indices, 
such as the Russell 2000 index, and simultaneously taking short positions in capital-
weighted indices, such as the S&P 500. (Haugen & Jorion, 1996.)  
Szakmary and Kiefer (2004) analyze returns of cash indices and futures relative to the 
S&P 500 to track smaller stocks at the turn of the year. In addition, the authors control 
for volatility clustering, autocorrelation of small stock index returns, and other 
calendar anomalies to provide robust estimates of the January effect. The data used in 
the study includes returns of portfolios combining long positions in the Value Line, 
S&P 400 Midcap, and Russell 2000 cash indices and futures, respectively, with a short 
position in the S&P 500 index. In this case, the indices of the long position portfolio 
are used as a proxy for the small-capitalization sector, since these indices track smaller 
stocks than the S&P 500. The authors find that market participants are seemingly 
eliminating the January effect with the exploitation of two new futures contracts on 
small-capitalization indices (the S&P Midcap 400 and Russell 2000 futures). Based on 
the results, after June 1993 the returns of the long position portfolio combined with 
short positions in the S&P 500 index are much lower during the traditional turn of the 
year window (last trading day of December and first five trading days in January). 
(Szakmary and Kiefer, 2004.)  
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Cooper, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2006) explore the predictive power of January 
returns over the period 1940-2003 for the rest of the year conditional on the January 
market return. The authors use an alternative approach to test this so-called "the other 
January effect" by controlling for macroeconomic/business cycle variables that have 
been shown to have a predictive effect on stock returns. In addition, the Presidential 
Cycle, investment sentiment, and different multifactor models are controlled for in the 
analysis. Authors' results indicate that over the following 11 months of the year, 
January stock returns are a remarkably robust predictor of market returns. When the 
CRSP value-weighted index return in January is positive, over the next 11 months, the 
index's average return is 14.8 percent. When the value-weighted index return is 
negative in January, the index's average return over the next 11 months is 2.92 percent, 
causing a spread of almost 12 percent. Even a larger spread of 18 percent is observed 
from the equal-weighted index returns.  Each of these spreads is economically and 
statistically significant. The authors find that the market and size premium returns are 
positive for the remainder of the year when January returns are positive. On the 
contrary, the market and size premium returns are negative for the rest of the year 
when January returns are negative. In both cases, the spreads are statistically 
significant. (Cooper, McConnel & Ovtchinnikov, 2006.)  
Patel (2016) investigates both developed and emerging stock markets from January 
1997 through December 2014. The empirical results are contradictory compared to 
previous studies since the returns in January are insignificant. Moreover, different 
volatility periods do not cause the January effect in each of the six indices. Notably, in 
most indices, returns in January are relatively lower than returns on the other eleven 
months since positive returns in January are generated only by the emerging stock and 
Russell 3000 index. Still, the January returns are not the highest compared to other 
months’ returns in the emerging stock and Russell 300 index. However, the study 
reveals significantly positive returns in April in three out of six indices and in 
December in four out of six indices. (Patel, 2016.) 
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4.2 Turn-of-the-month effect 
One significant extensively studied calendar anomaly is related to significantly high 
stock returns during the month's last trading days and the first few trading days of the 
following month. Ariel (1987) first documented this so-called turn-of-the-month 
anomaly (TOM). The author investigates seasonal patterns of daily CRSP value-
weighted and equal-weighted stock index returns from 1963 – 1981. Empirical results 
show that the average return on the month's last trading day and the first half of the 
following month is positive and significantly different from zero. In contrast, the 
average return is even negative in the second half of the month. (Ariel, 1987.) 
Further, Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) analyze the evidence of monthly regularities 
using a similar method to Ariel (1987) by adding little new data for the monthly 
seasonality. The authors point out that it is crucial to use new data on hypotheses 
testing since it avoids data-snooping. The data-snooping bias is related to a practical 
problem, in which many different hypotheses are tested based on the same data. In the 
presence of data-snooping, conventional significance levels may show preliminary 
results with the same data unless theories are not refined. Therefore, the authors take 
a more critical approach in assessing significance levels by adjusting individual 
hypotheses. Nonetheless, the authors observe numerous calendar anomalies over 90 
years of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. The average returns are 
exceptionally high throughout the sample when the turn-of-the-month window from 
the last trading day of the month (t-1) to the third trading day of the following month 
(t+3). The cumulative growth rate over the four days around the month's turn is 0.473 
percent, while the average growth rate is 0.0612 percent. The difference is highly 
statistically significant. The frequency of positive returns is also higher for the turn-
of-the-month window than for a regular day. (Lakonishok & Smidt, 1988.)  
Ogden (1990) studies the reasons behind the TOM effect and partially the January 
effect by testing the hypothesis that the concentration of cash flows at the turn of each 
calendar month causes these monthly irregularities in the US stock market returns. Due 
to this standardization, investors receive significant cash flow at the turn of the month, 
particularly at the turn of the year, whose reinvestments increase the return on stocks 
at the turn of the month. These arguments are based on Ogden’s (1987) study, 
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discovering a “preferred habitat” effect. According to the effect, a specific payoff date 
occurs at the turn of each calendar month, when real wages, dividends, principal and 
interest payments, and other liabilities are paid (Ogden, 1987). The magnitude of an 
increase in a month depends on the extent of the total liquid gains received during the 
month, and monetary policy, in turn, affects these liquid gains. Therefore, this 
hypothesis is related to the turn-of-the-month liquidity hypothesis. (Ogden, 1990.) 
Ogden’s (1990) empirical results are consistent with Lakonishok and Smidt’s (1988) 
findings based on significantly high returns on the four trading days at the turn of the 
month. In addition, Ogden conducts regression analysis of stock index returns (CRSP 
Value and Equal-weighted) over the period 1969-1986, where he uses turn-of-month 
trading days and the Fed funds spread as explanatory variables. The turn-of-month 
variable represents the trading day window from last trading day of the month (-1) 
through the third trading day of the following month (+1, +2, +3), and the Fed funds 
spread is defined as the difference of the Fed funds rate median and the short-term 
Treasury bill rate median for a given month. Based on the regression results, the 
coefficient of the fed funds spread is not significant for both indices, whereas the 
interaction term, that is, the product of turn-of-month and fed funds spread variables, 
is significant and negative for both indices. This indicates that tighter monetary policy 
limits overall liquidity profits and increases the expected liquidity costs required to 
meet month-end obligations. Thus, there is an inverse relationship between stock 
returns on turn-of-month trading days and the stringency of monetary policy. (Ogden, 
1990.) 
Agrawal and Tandon (1994) extend the examination of the turn-of-the-month effect 
among multiple other calendar anomalies to eighteen countries other than the US. 
Consistent with Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), the authors note the possibility of 
illusions in numerous studies of calendar anomalies due to statistical errors and biases 
in empirical procedures. Agrawal and Tandon's (1994) research provides evidence on 
the nature and presence of calendar anomalies internationally since previous studies 
have focused on investigating anomalies in the US. Therefore, evidence from other 
countries offers more understanding of the underlying reasons for the anomalies 
observed in the US. The authors find relatively significant and significantly positive 
returns for the last trading day (day -1) of the month in ten of eighteen countries, 
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similar to Lakonishok and Smidt's (1988) results for the US. The cumulative return 
over the four-day window around the turn of the month is significantly higher than the 
average four-day return in ten countries. More than 70 percent of the average monthly 
return in six countries is concentrated over a less than five-day period around the 
month's turn. Additionally, the variance of the last day of the month is very low in 
most countries. (Agrawal & Tandon, 1994.)  
As evidence from an emerging market, Volkan, Kayacetin, and Lekpek (2016) analyze 
the widely recognized TOM effect in Turkish equity returns. The authors find that 
between 1988 and 2014, the TOM effect is strongly significant, with an average return 
of BIST100 index is 0.46 percent in the TOM period and 0.09 percent during the 
remaining days. Here, the TOM period covers the last trading day of each month and 
the first two trading days of the following month. In the subperiod examination, the 
average TOM return is 0.60 percent during 1988 – 1996, 0.56 percent during 1997-
2005, 0.20 percent during 2006-2014, and highly significant in each subperiod. 
Although the average return is lower in the most recent subperiod, the share of the 
TOM period in total returns exhibits an increase from 39 percent in 1988 – 1996 to 49 
percent in 1997-2005 and 86 percent in 2006-2014, indicating the amplification of 
TOM effect. In addition, the authors extract the conditional volatility of the index via 
an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) 
model. This way, the authors find that the change in expected volatility from the earlier 
month-end to the current month-end explains a statistically and economically 
significant share of the TOM period returns. (Volkan, Kayacetin & Lekpek, 2016.)  
4.3 Day-of-the-week effect 
The day-of-the-week (DOW) effect is a phenomenon in the stock markets, where the 
return on a particular weekday is significantly higher/lower than on other days. 
Initially, it has been documented that the returns on Friday are exceptionally high, and 
after the weekend, returns are remarkably low on Monday (Cross 1973; French 1980; 
Gibbons and Hess 1981). As well as the January/monthly effect and turn-of-the-month 
effect, commonly argued theories are based on the behavioral finance framework. For 
example, Thaler (1987b) argues that institutional investors and other funds may limit 
stock sales at the end of the week so that weekly aggregate performance indicators do 
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not decrease. In addition, mood-related explanations suggest more optimistic investor 
behavior as the weekend approaches. (Thaler, 1987b).   
The first well-known findings regarding the daily seasonal effect in returns have been 
published by Cross (1973). Cross (1973) studies the relationship and distribution of 
Standard and Poor’s composite price changes on Mondays and Fridays. The data 
included a total of 844 observations on Monday and 844 on Friday. The main findings 
show that the index increases 62 percent of all Friday observations and 39,5 percent of 
all Monday observations, respectively. The average return also exhibits a higher return 
on Fridays than on Mondays. Moreover, Cross (1973) finds that a price increase 
increases in 48,8 percent of cases in the following Monday. Throughout the whole 
sample, a significant negative Monday effect is reported.  
French (1980) examines daily returns of the Standard & Poor’s composite portfolio 
from 1953 to 1977 and finds that the average return for Monday is significantly 
negative over the period and in five subperiods. French’s (1980) empirical tests 
indicate that the information tends to be unfavorable over the weekend. For instance, 
if there is a threat of “panic selling” among companies as bad news occurs, companies 
might postpone the announcement until the weekend, allowing more time to process 
the information. Indeed, this kind of behavior is possible, but it does not systematically 
result in negative stock returns in an efficient market. Instead, investors would expect 
unfavorable news to be released on weekends, and throughout the week, they would 
discount stock prices appropriately. Even if negative Monday returns were found and 
this information was based on a potential investment strategy, the profits are more 
limited than they might appear. Based on these findings, one simple trading strategy 
for an individual investor would be to purchase the S&P portfolio every Monday 
afternoon and sell those investments on Friday afternoon, holding cash during the 
weekend. Excluding transaction costs, this trading strategy would have generated an 
average annual return of 13,4 percent from 1953 to 1977, while a simple buy and hold 
strategy would have yielded an annual return of 5.5 percent. However, because 
investors cannot avoid transaction costs, a transaction cost of 0.25 percent would have 
generated a lower return in each of the 24 years studied. (French, 1980.) 
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Gibbons and Hess (1981) find similar daily patterns in asset returns as French (1980). 
In addition, Monday’s negative return is remarkably uniform across individual stocks. 
The authors conduct the empirical tests with the S&P 500 and the CRSP equal- and 
value-weighted portfolios. In addition, tests are also shown with actively traded 
individual securities of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index to avoid the 
nontrading problem and determine the extent of the Monday effect across securities. 
According to the results, negative Monday returns appear solid and persistent on stocks 
and treasury bills. Even after the adjustments in the market, stock returns still show 
day-of-the-week effects, although these effects are not concentrated on a specific 
weekday. (Gibbons and Hess, 1981.) 
Keim and Stambaugh (1984) examine the day-of-the-week effect on larger scale by 
including both large and small capitalization stocks of S&P 500 and extending the time 
span to 55 years from 1928 through 1982.  According to the authors, negative Monday 
returns are consistent throughout the 55-years. In addition, the smaller the company, 
the more likely it is that average returns on Friday are high. Furthermore, since the 
NYSE was opened on Saturdays before 1952, the authors note that returns on Friday 
are lower when Saturday is open for trading. The return on Saturday appears to be 
larger than returns on other days indicating that highest return of the week occurs 
during the last trading day. Possible explanations of existence of such daily seasonality 
might be due to measurement errors. These errors refer to the hypothesis that positive 
errors in prices on Friday cause low Monday returns. Thus, the higher-than-mean 
errors on Friday tends to induce lower-than-average returns on Monday when these 
errors vary over time. In other words, this kind of behavior would result a lower (even 
negative) correlation between returns on Monday and Friday than between returns on 
other consecutive trading days. However, the authors document that returns between 
Friday and Monday are highly correlated, and thus the measurement error explanation 
is not consistent for explaining the weekend effect. (Keim & Stambaugh, 1984.) 
Smirlock and Starks (1986) examine day-of-the-week effects using hourly values of 
the DJIA index over 1963 – 1983. The authors find that the dynamics of the weekend 
effect have changed over time. Particularly the weekend effect has “moved upwards” 
over time. Over the first period from 1963 to 1968, Friday close to Monday open return 
is positive. This return is weakened by a negative return throughout the remainder of 
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the day, which leads to a negative return throughout the entire trading day. During the 
second subperiod, 1968 – 1974, weekend return is slightly negative, but the weekend 
effect is mainly due to significant negative returns during opening hours. Finally, in 
the post-1974 period, the return for the trading period on Monday is positive, although 
the return on opening hours is significantly negative. There is a non-trading weekend 
effect during this period characterized by a significant negative return from the closing 
price on Friday to the opening price on Monday. Thus, the authors suggest instability 
in the return generating process in the differences of hourly returns and their patterns 
across subperiods. (Smirlock & Starks, 1986.)  
Connolly (1989) analyzes the robustness of the day-of-the-week and weekend effects 
with alternative estimation and testing approaches. The study uses daily return data of 
the S&P 500 index, equal-weighted CRSP index, and value-weighted CRSP index. 
The period for the analysis is from the first trading day in 1963 to the last trading day 
in 1983. The simple linear regression results show that the average Monday return is 
significantly negative while other days’ returns are generally positive. A similar 
pattern emerges for the first four subsamples, and the magnitude of the negative 
Monday return increases. However, the results change for the 1975 – 1977 subsample, 
in which Monday’s estimated return is positive. The negative Monday returns pattern 
reappears for the 1978 – 1980 and 1981 – 1983 subsamples, but the coefficient 
estimate is significantly different from zero only for the value-weighted index return. 
Additional tests by controlling for volatility clustering in daily results with a GARCH 
(1,1) support the evidence of weekend effect until the mid-1970s. (Connolly, 1989.)  
Brooks and Persand (2001a) study the existence of the DOW-effect in five Southeast 
Asian stock exchanges: South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia. 
The authors use daily closing prices for all weekdays (Mondays to Fridays) from 31 
December 1989 through 19 January 1996. The first simple linear regression model 
indicates that neither South Korea nor the Philippines exhibit significant calendar 
effects; Malaysia and Thailand show positive Monday and Tuesday effects. 
Wednesday effect is documented in Taiwan. Although the significant coefficients 
support the existence of the DOW-effect, risk factors have not been accounted for in 
the first estimation model. Hence, a more interactive estimation model is used to 
observe the variation of risk across the weekdays. This model includes market risk, 
30 
which is proxied by the FTA World Price Index return. After accounting for the market 
risk factor, there are positive Monday effects in Thailand and Malaysia and a positive 
Thursday effect in Malaysia. In addition, the t-ratios decreased slightly in absolute 
value, indicating that the day-of-the-week effects are somewhat reduced. For Taiwan’s 
stock market, the negative Wednesday effect completely disappears. It is also evident 
that average risk levels vary across weekdays. For example, the beta is 0.36 on Monday 
and 1.02 on Tuesday. This indicates that the movements of the Thailand stock market 
on Mondays are lower in relation to the movements of the general world stock market. 
(Brooks & Persand, 2001.)  
Bhattacharya, Sarkar, and Mukhopadhyay (2003) provide evidence of the DOW effect 
in Indian markets. The authors assert that stock exchange regulations and the link 
between the banking sector and the financial market might significantly impact daily 
seasonality. The banking sector in India maintains a cash reserve ratio for an average 
of two weeks and reports to the Reserve Bank of India every other Friday, called 
reporting Friday. Due to this settlement process, the authors find a significant 
difference in the Friday returns between reporting and non-reporting weeks in the 
Indian stock markets. In particular, the GARCH analysis reports substantial positive 
returns on non-reporting Thursday and Friday, whereas the OLS procedure reports 
significant positive returns only on non-reporting Monday. (Bhattacharya, Sarkar, 
Mukhopadhyay, 2003.) 
Chiah and Zhong (2019) investigate the day-of-the-week effect in 24 international 
stock markets, particularly how the QMJ factor is associated with the effect. The QMJ 
factor is the difference between the returns of quality stocks and returns of junk stocks. 
The QMJ factor focuses on the profitability, safety, and growth of individual stocks, 
and these areas are captured by selecting a raft of proxies. For instance, to measure the 
safety dimension, beta, idiosyncratic volatility, leverage, bankruptcy risks, and 
volatility of return on equity (ROE) are used as proxies. The authors present a 
hypothesis related to investors’ mood, in which investors tend to view speculative 
stocks more favorably on Friday and non-speculative stocks on Monday. Thus, stocks 
considered high in quality coincide with long positions without speculation, whereas 
junk stocks involve more speculative short trading. As such, a high (low) QMJ 
premium is predicted on Monday (Friday). The main findings show that, globally, 
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QMJ is significantly positive on Monday. On the contrary, the OMJ spread is globally 
lowest on Friday but not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the OML spread 
decreases monotonically from Monday to Friday, as the difference in returns is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. (Chiah & Zhong, 2019.) 
4.4 Disappearance of calendar anomalies 
Whether an anomaly is risk-related or behavioral, it should have a direct impact on its 
long-term behavior. Thus, anomalies related to behavioral characteristics should be 
slowly arbitraged away as investors observe them and begin to take advantage of them 
(Fama, 1998). However, Cochrane (1999) argues that systematic risk factors related to 
stock return regularity should not cause the disappearance of the regularity since these 
risk factors can generally be considered latent. Because the awareness of calendar 
anomalies has grown substantially, their importance as trading strategies has 
diminished.  
Marquering et al. (2006) report disappearances regarding the weekend, holiday, and 
January due to increased data snooping and academic publications of these anomalies. 
Mainly, the magnitude of these anomalies decreases significantly after the first 
publication of a relevant academic topic. For instance, the abnormal return generated 
by the holiday effect dropped 77 percent after the initial publication. Thus, market 
participants could grow their awareness of these anomalies through academic research. 
(Marquering et al., 2006.) 
Shanaev and Ghimire (2021) measure the magnitude of the disappearance of various 
stock market anomalies using the Google Scholar search algorithm based on research 
topics relevant to examining anomaly-exploiting trading strategies. The authors' 
method measures the effects of post-publication decay, scholarly attention, and data-
snooping bias. As a result, the authors find that as academic attention increases, the 
turn-of-the-month, Monday, and January effects diminish substantially, indicating that 
market participants can quickly assess academic research findings by applying them 
to their investments. Thus, eventually, these are arbitraged away, as Fama (1998) 
argues. (Shanaev & Ghimire, 2021.) 
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5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
This section presents the data and methodology used in this study. The data consists 
of the daily closing values of seven emerging market stock indices from December 30, 
2004, to December 31, 2020. The data is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
a widely used provider of financial information. Often, calendar effects in stock 
markets can be easily identified using only time-series information of stock indices 
(Lim et al., 2010). Thus, this study uses only stock index values as data. Table 1 shows 
the indices used in this thesis. 
 
The data includes three Eastern European countries, two Southeast Asian countries, 
and one country from Africa. All the indices are capitalization-weighted, diversified, 
and have a relatively long history. The anomalies tested for indices are day-of-the-
week, turn-of-the-month, and the January/turn-of-the-year effect. The period used in 
this study shows both upward and downward fluctuations in the index values, as shown 
in figures 1 and 2 below. The global financial crisis and the global pandemic are shown 
in the figures as the value of each index declines significantly in 2008 and 2020. It can 
be observed the main trends are pretty similar in the emerging market indices. 
However, the overall change in the indices differs quite a lot since the markets have 
not reacted uniformly to domestic and international impulses. 
Country Stock Exchange Index 
Czech 
Republic 
Prague Stock Exchange Prague SE (PX) 
 
Hungary Budapest Stock Exchange Budabest SE (BUX) 
Malaysia Malaysia Stock Exchange FTSE Bursa Malaysia (KLCI) 
Poland Warsaw Stock Exchange Warsaw SE (WIG) 
South Africa Johannesburg Stock Exchange SA All Share Index (FTSE/JSE) 
South Korea Korea Stock Exchange Korea SE (KOSPI) 
 
Table 1. List of the six emerging market exchanges 
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Figure 1. Price development of Johannesburg, Warsaw and Budapest stock exchanges  
 
Figure 2. Price development of Prague, Malaysian and Korea stock exchanges 
5.1 Methodology 
The purpose of the study is to find out whether the indices under examination exhibit 
any day-of-the-week, turn-of-the-month, and January/turn-of-the-year effects. The 
model's dependent variable is the daily index return, and the seasonal dummy variables 
represent explanatory variables. In the study, the daily logarithmic returns are 
calculated for each index as follows:  
                                                            𝑅𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
)                                                          (1) 
where 𝑅𝑡 represents the logarithmic return of the index at time t, 𝑃𝑡 is the value of the 





















5.1.1 Linear regression models  
We can economically treat seasonality with an appropriate model to include the 
dummy variables in the regression equations. The number of seasonal variables that 
could reasonably be constructed to model seasonality depends on the frequency of the 
data. For instance, four dummy variables would be constructed for quarterly data, 
twelve for monthly data, five for daily data, and so on. However, to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity, the constant term is not included. Alternatively, if a constant term is 
included, one of the dummy variables is excluded. (Brooks, 2019, p.450.)  
The turn-of-the-month effect is estimates with the following simple linear regression 
model: 
                                                   𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝛽1𝐷1𝑡  + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (2) 
Where 𝑅𝑡 is the stock index return at time t,  is the constant term, 𝛽1 is the estimated 
regression coefficient, 𝐷1𝑡 is the dummy variable which gets value 1 at turn-of-the-
month trading days and otherwise zero. The trading days included in the dummy 
variable are from -1 through +3, that is last four days of the month and first three days 
of the following month. This trading day window is proposed by Lakonishok and 
Smidt (1988) and it is very commonly used in analyzing TOM effects. The null 
hypothesis states that stock returns at the turn of the month are not different than days 
outside the TOM window:  
                                                 𝐻0 = 𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑀 = 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑀                                                    (3) 
Where 𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑀 denotes the coefficient of average TOM days (-1…+3) and 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝑀 stands 
for the average daily returns on rest of the month. The application of the Lakonishok 
and Smidt (1988) method is also relevant in estimating the day-of-the-week effect. The 
day-of-the-week effect is tested with a simple linear regression model:   
                                                𝑅𝑡 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
4
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                         (4) 
35 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the return at time 𝑡 for each index examined separately, the constant term 
𝑎0 represent Monday which is the reference term against which all the other weekdays 
are compared to. Thus, the estimate of the constant is 𝑎0 representing Monday, 𝑎0 + 
𝑎2𝑖 on Tuesday and so on. Similarly, The January/Month of the year effect is tested in 
a similar way using dummy variables and a constant term. The dummy variable 
regression model is as follows:  
                                                  𝑅𝑡 =  𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
11
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                               (5)  
Where 𝑅𝑡 represent the daily stock return for the index, 𝑎0 represent the reference 
category for January and all the other months are average deviations from January. 
With this simple estimation model, the dummy variable trap is avoided. 
Using the models described above, the hypotheses for the estimates are that there are 
no abnormal returns at each calendar month, or day of the week. Thus, there is no 
January effect or day-of-the-week effect, and the expected returns are almost equal for 
each weekday and month. Thus, the null hypothesis for can be expressed as: 
                               𝐻0 = 𝑎𝑀𝑂𝑁 = 𝑎𝑇𝑈𝐸 = 𝑎𝑊𝐸𝐷 = 𝑎𝑇𝐻𝑈 = 𝑎𝐹𝑅𝐼                              (6)  
Where 𝐻0 represents the null hypothesis for day-of-the-week effect and 𝑎𝑀𝑂𝑁…𝑎𝐹𝑅𝐼 
denote the the coefficient estimates for each weekday. Similarly, for the January effect, 
the null hypothesis states that no month of the year exhibits significantly different 
returns than all other months: 
 𝐻0 = 𝑎𝐽𝐴𝑁 = 𝑎𝐹𝐸𝐵 = 𝑎𝑀𝐴𝑅 = 𝑎𝐴𝑃𝑅 = 𝑎𝑀𝐴𝑌 = 𝑎𝐽𝑈𝑁 = 𝑎𝐽𝑈𝐿 = 𝑎𝐴𝑈𝐺 = 𝑎𝑆𝐸𝑃 =
𝑎𝑂𝐶𝑇 = 𝑎𝑁𝑂𝑉 = 𝑎𝐷𝐸𝐶                                                                                                    (7) 
Where 𝐻0 denotes the hypothesis for January effect and 𝑎𝐽𝐴𝑁…𝑎𝐷𝐸𝐶 represent the 




The OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) model is perhaps the most common approach in 
detecting calendar anomalies. However, the problem with OLS-based models using 
daily data is that the returns have the tendency to be autocorrelated, the residuals are 
more likely non-normal, and standard t-tests tend to be upwardly biased (Connolly, 
1989). According to Engle (1982), high-frequency data such as stock returns, interest 
rates, and exchange rates tend to cause an effect known as volatility clustering. This 
refers to a phenomenon where there is a systematic tendency for large shocks to be 
followed by large shocks and small shocks by small ones, indicating conditional 
volatility in the residuals. Therefore, Engle (1982) proposes the Lagrange multiplier 
test for ARCH (Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) disturbances. If 
volatility clustering is found based on the ARCH-LM test, then an ARCH or GARCH 
model specification should be conducted. The following GARCH (1,1) model, which 
is developed by Bollerslev (1986), is used to test the turn-of-the-month, day-of-the-
week, and January/monthly effects: 
                            ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖ℎ𝑡−1    𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡)                                               (8)  
In the equation above, 𝑞 is the lag length for “moving average parameter” and 𝑝 for 
autoregressive term. Because the GARCH model is used to estimate the volatility of 
the error term, the conditional variance ℎ𝑡 is not constant but depends on 𝑞 lags of 
squared residuals. Thus, the sign of the error term 𝜀𝑡 is unpredictable and the variance 
of the error term must be non-negative and fulfill the following positivity conditions:  
                                                  ℎ𝑡 > 0: 𝑎0 > 0: 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0                                        (9)  
According to Bhattacharya, Sarkar, and Mukhopadhyay (2003), the main 
shortcomings in estimating seasonal effects arise due to possible misspecifications of 
the conditional mean equation. For instance, the omission of lagged returns as 
explanatory variables or structural breaks in the sample may cause instability in the 
parameters. Harvey (1995) finds that serial correlation in the stock returns of emerging 
markets is much higher than in developed countries. Moreover, Harvey (1995) argues 
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that possible explanations are lack of diversification, lower market size, and trading 
activity. Hence, when the indices are dominated by a few stocks or specialized in a 
specific sector, this will generally lead to a higher serial correlation in the returns. 
Thus, when indices are dominated by a few stocks or specialized in a particular sector, 
this usually results in a higher autocorrelation in returns. Based on the evidence of high 
autocorrelation in the emerging market returns, the mean equation is specified with an 
ARIMA (p,d,q) process to mitigate possible autocorrelation in the returns.  
It has been documented that the standard GARCH models have limitations because 
they force a symmetric volatility response into positive and negative shocks. This is 
because the conditional variance depends on the magnitude of the lagged residuals and 
not their sign. Typically, a positive shock is likely to cause less volatility than a 
negative shock of the same extent for stock returns. Such asymmetries are related to 
leverage effects, in which a company’s debt to equity increases due to a fall in the 
company’s stock price. Therefore, the shareholders of a company might consider the 
firm to be relatively more volatile. (Brooks, 2019, p.404.) Moreover, Harvey and 
Bakaert (1997) argue that standard GARCH models encounter difficulties fitting 
highly volatile and non-normally distributed returns due to asymmetric volatility in 
emerging markets. Thus, an asymmetric GARCH model is conducted in the analysis. 
The exponential GARCH model, proposed by Nelson (1991), has numerous ways to 
express the conditional variance equation, but one possible specification is given by: 
                          ln(𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝜔 + 𝛽 ln(𝜎𝑡−1











  ]                  (10) 
With the comparison of the standard GARCH model, the EGARCH has several 
advantages. First, non-negativity constraints are not an issue since the logarithm of the 
variance is modeled. Furthermore, if the relationship between returns and volatility is 
negative, then the asymmetry term is negative, in which the EGARCH model allows 
asymmetric volatility. (Brooks, 2019, p.406.) 
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5.1.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of daily returns for every index. The mean return 
is highest in South Africa and lowest in the Czech Republic. Additionally, the returns 
in the Czech Republic are the most volatile since the daily standard deviation is the 
highest. When looking at the higher moment values, all the indices' daily returns are 
negatively skewed. This means that the probability distribution is asymmetric, and the 
probability of negative expected returns is higher than positive expected returns. 
Furthermore, the kurtosis measures the fatness of the distribution's tails and how 
peaked the series's mean is. Since a normal distribution is defined to have a kurtosis 
value equal to three, the distributions of each index return series have significant 
excess kurtosis. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the indices  
5.1.4 Asymmetric volatility tests  
Following Engle and Ng (1993), the sign and size bias test is computed jointly to 
determine whether an asymmetric model is required for the return series. In the 
presence of sign bias, positive and negative shocks have differing impacts upon 
conditional volatility. If there is a size bias, then the magnitude of a shock will also 
impact conditional volatility. Here, the test for asymmetric volatility is applied to the 
residuals of GARCH (1,1) model with the following regression: 
                    ?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑆𝑡−1
− + 𝜙2𝑆𝑡−1
− ?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝜙3𝑆𝑡−1
+ ?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡                            (11) 
where ?̂?𝑡
2 represents the squared residuals of a GARCH model fitted to the returns, 𝜙0 
denotes the constant term, 𝑆𝑡−1
−  denotes a dummy variable taking the value 1 if ?̂?𝑡−1< 
 PX BUX KLCI WIG FTSE/JSE KOSPI 
Mean -0.001 0.0263 0.0148 0.0190 0.0387 0.0295 
Maximum 12.4 13.2 6.6 6.1 9.0 11.3 
Minimum -16.2 -12.6 -10.0 -13.5 -10.2 -11.2 
Std. Dev. 0.014 0.015 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Skewness -0.66 -0.29 -0.90 -0.77 -0.33 -0.53 
Kurtosis 19.68 10.88 16.93 10.26 9.15 12.32 
Observations 4012 3990 3936 4002 4000 3957 
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0 and zero otherwise, 𝑣𝑡 denotes an error term and 𝑆𝑡−1
+  is defined as 1 - 𝑆𝑡−1
− . In the 
case where 𝜙1 is significant, there is a sign bias. Furthermore, if either 𝜙2 or 𝜙3 is 
significant, there is also a size bias (Brooks, 2019, p.406.) 
As can be seen from table 3, asymmetric effects on volatility are highly significant. 
For instance, there is a sign bias in the South African stock exchange since the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, there is a strong 
indicator of size bias for all indices except for the Malaysian stock exchange. All in 
all, these test results confirm that it is sensible to estimate GARCH models which allow 
for asymmetric volatility. 
 
Table 3. Engle and Ng (1993) test for asymmetric volatility. T-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % 








      PX BUX KLCI  WIG FTSE/JSE KOSPI 
Constant    0.98 0.99 0.93   1.06  0.95      0.99 
 (17.04)***   (17.21)***  (13.69)*** (16.73)***   (18.12)*** (18.12)*** 
Sign-Bias     0.11    -0.07 0.17 -0.03   0.22     0.05 
   (1.40)    (0.00)   (1.80)* (-0.39)  (2.98)***    (0.70) 
Negative-Bias    -3.71    -7.29    -8.05 -8.92   2.90   -12.39 
   (-0.95)   (-2.02)**   (-0.97) (-1.98)**  (0.72) (-3.10)*** 
Positive-Bias   -12.74    -6.28   -12.97 -19.33 -11.95   -17.56 
  (-2.79)***   (-1.60)   (-1.34) (-3.56)***    (-2.66)***  (-3.72)*** 
40 
6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This chapter presents and evaluates empirical results. Firstly, visual inspection is 
conducted to see how the returns are clustered around each month, turn of the month, 
and weekday. Afterward, results regarding the regression results are presented and 
analyzed in more detail.  
6.1 Results from linear regression model  
Figure 3 shows that, on average, the highest positive returns are clustered around the 
turn of the month for almost every index. Clearly, very high average returns are 
clustered around the first day of the month and around the last three trading days of 
the month. In addition, some notable spikes can be seen around the middle of the 
month. The figure highlights the key dynamics of the anomaly; that is the amount is 
investments is relatively high during and around paydays.  
 
Figure 3. Average daily returns during each trading day of the month  
Figure 4 shows the average daily returns in each calendar month. There are notable 
high average daily returns in April, July, and December. However, January returns do 
not appear to be very high. Consistent with the findings of Claessens et al. (1995), 
there is no evidence of the January effect in emerging markets.  Since the positive 
average returns of calendar months are highly clustered during April, the tax-loss 
selling hypothesis does not explain the anomaly because the tax year of the countries 
































BUX WIG FTSE/JSE SA PX KLCI KOSPI
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under examination is a calendar year. It can also be observed from the figure that a 
significant part of the negative returns occurs between May and October, although in 
July, the returns are positive on average. This may indicate a known calendar anomaly 
called “Sell in May or go away” (Bouman and Jacobsen, 2002). 
 
Figure 4. Average daily returns during each calendar month  
Figure 3 shows the average daily returns for each day of the week for each index. There 
seems to be lot of deviation based on the average returns for each stock index. 
Regarding the well-known weekend effect, the Malaysian stock exchange exhibits 
high returns on Friday and low returns on Monday. In other respects, the indices under 
review do not appear to have significant positive or negative returns on different days 
of the week.  
 











































Day of the week
FTSE/JSE SA WIG PX KLCI KOSPI BUX
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Based on table 4, in Prague, Budapest, Malaysian exchanges, there appears to be a 
statistically significant turn-of-the-month effect, at least at the 5 percent significance 
level. The coefficients of the turn-of-the-month (TOM) estimates are positive, 
indicating that, on average, the returns at the turn of the month days are significantly 
higher compared to trading days that are outside the TOM window. For example, the 
average daily return of the Prague Exchange is 0.15 percent in the TOM window, and 
apart from the TOM window, the average daily return is -0.03 percent. 
 
 
Table 4. OLS regression results of the turn-of-the-month effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell as 
percentages and the t-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted as 
*, ** and *** respectively 
Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of the day-of-the-week effect. The day-of-
the-week effect occurs only in the Malaysian exchange because the average deviations 
of the Monday and other days of the week are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. The average Monday return is negative and statistically significant. 
Thus, on Mondays, investors are more likely to sell their stocks at the Malaysian 
exchange and buy them on the rest of the weekdays.  
 
Table 5. OLS regression results of the day-of-the-week effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell as 
percentages and the t-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted as 
*, ** and *** respectively. 
Variable PX BUX KCLI WIG FTSE/JSE SA KOSPI 
TOM (%) 0.15 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05 
 (2.74) *** (2.97) *** (2.02) ** (-1.56) (-0.81) (-0.98) 
Constant (%) -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
 (-1.20) (-0.32) (-0.22) (-0.19) (-1.42) (-0.90) 







































































F-stat 0.31 0.49 3.64*** 0.85 0.25 0.83 
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Table 6 reports the OLS regression results regarding the January effect and monthly 
seasonality in the indices. As can be seen, none of the indices report any monthly 
effects because none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Moreover, based 
on the F-statistic, there are no significant differences in the mean returns between each 
month. This indicates that the January/monthly effects have disappeared in the 
emerging markets, and April’s returns are not statistically significant either, although 
visual inspection exhibits relatively high returns in April. 
 
Table 6. OLS regression results of the January/monthly effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell as 
percentages and the t-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted as 
*, ** and *** respectively.  
Based on the results of OLS regression models, the most observed calendar effect is 
the turn-of-the-month effect. In addition, only in the Malaysian exchange, significant 
seasonality in the average weekday returns have been found. The January effect or any 
monthly effects are not present in any of the indices. As noted early, numerous studies 
have shown that the January effect/monthly effects have existed, and particularly 
among small capitalization indices, but they have disappeared during the 21st century. 
Since this thesis focus on large capitalization-weighted indices, it confirms that 
monthly seasonality is unlikely to exist. However, since the OLS models are based 









































































































































































F-stat 0.85 0.75 1.40 0.90 0.40 1.40 
44 
purely on the average differences in the daily returns, and the time-varying volatility 
of the models has not been considered, the anomalies are re-estimated with GARCH 
models, including autoregressive and or moving average terms. 
6.2 Standard GARCH (1,1) model -results   
Table 7 presents the results for the turn-of-the-month effect with GARCH (1,1) 
specification. The turn-of-the-month effect is highly significant at the 1 percent level 
for Prague and Budapest exchanges. Additionally, the turn-of-the-month effect is still 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the Malaysian exchange. 
Based on the residual diagnostics, the GARCH (1,1) eradicates serial correlation in the 
residuals up to 20 lags apart from the Prague exchange, where the second lag of Ljung 
Box Q-statistic is statistically significant at 5 percent level. Thus, the model fails to 
account for the serial dependence in the residuals. The autocorrelation issue is still 
present when testing the model after including several autoregressive and/or moving 
average terms. Furthermore, the ARCH-LM test indicates no remaining 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals apart from the Warsaw stock exchange. This means 
that volatility clustering is still present, and therefore the model is not well-specified 
for the Warsaw exchange. 
The variance equation's coefficients on both the lagged squared (ARCH) residual and 
lagged conditional variance (GARCH) terms are highly statistically significant. Also, 
the constant term is statistically significant. In addition, as is typical of GARCH model 
estimates for stock returns, the sum of the coefficients in terms of the ARCH and 
GARCH is very close to one. This implies that shocks to the conditional variance will 






Table 7. GARCH (1,1) regression results of the turn-of-the-month effect. Coefficients are reported in each 
cell as percentages and the z-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are 
denoted as *, ** and *** respectively. 
Table 8 reports the GARCH (1,1) regression results for the day-of-the-week effect. 
The sum of the ARCH and GARCH terms is very close to one, suggesting highly 
persistent volatility. For the Prague, Warsaw, and Johannesburg exchanges, the 
dummy variables of Monday are positive and statistically significant. Moreover, for 
the Malaysian and Korean exchanges, the coefficient for Tuesday is positive and 
statistically significant. This means that the difference between the average Tuesday 
and average Monday is significantly high, indicating a positive Tuesday effect. 
Furthermore, the positive Friday effect remains in the Malaysian exchange since the 
average return difference between Monday and Friday is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. Thus, after including the AR(1) term, the negative Monday effect 
disappears due to the serial dependence structure in the daily return series. 
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(5.68)*** 























































Log likelihood 12700.13 11710.19 14413.40 12440.59 12611.45 12536.98 
ARCH (F-stat) 5 lags 0.48 0.50 0.44 2.47** 1.38 1.71 
ARCH (Prob) 5 lags 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.03 0.23 0.13 
LQB (1) 3.83 0.40 0.46 0.88 1.53 0.85 
LQB (2) 3.87** 1.91 0.46 1.87 1.53 2.92 
LQB (3) 4.40* 2.94 1.51 2.86 2.30 3.73 
LQB (4) 6.29 4.96 2.91 3.34 2.31 4.35 
LQB (5) 7.18 5.11 4.77 3.70 3.12 5.81 
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Moreover, the highly effective ARCH term indicates that the returns on the previous 
day influence returns on a particular day. The residual diagnostics show 
autocorrelation in the Prague exchange, although the significance level of the Q-
statistic in lag 2 is now significant at the 10 percent level. Even though the inclusion 
of seasonal dummy variables might reduce the serial dependence in the residuals, the 
Q-statistic shows significant autocorrelation at the 1 percent level from the ninth lag 
onwards. Other indices, on the other hand, do not exhibit any autocorrelation up to 20 
lags. In addition, no significant ARCH effect is detected apart for the Warsaw stock 
exchange. The Korean exchange also displays heteroscedasticity since the ARCH test's 
F-stat is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity issues regarding Prague, Warsaw and Korean exchanges indicates 
the inadequacy of the GARCH (1,1) model. 
 
Table 8. GARCH (1,1) regression results of the day-of-the-week effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell 
as percentages and the z-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted 
as *, ** and *** respectively. 










































































  10.48 
(6.09)*** 



























































Log likelihood 12697.60 11708.13 14413.67 12441.17 12612.21 12540.66 
ARCH (F-stat) 5 lags 0.50 0.51 0.46     2.52** 1.31   1.91* 
ARCH (Prob) 5 lags 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.03 0.25 0.09 
LQB (1) 3.68 0.34 0.44 0.78 1.79 0.86 
LQB (2) 3.74* 1.81 0.44 1.69 1.79 3.07 
LQB (3) 4.17 2.72 1.41 2.62 2.47 4.07 
LQB (4) 6.03 4.94 3.02 3.06 2.47 4.70 
LQB (5) 6.60 5.29 5.02 3.35 3.46 6.21 
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Table 9 reports the GARCH (1,1) results for the January/monthly effect. The results 
report significantly positive returns in January and negative for the Prague stock 
exchange in May and June. Therefore, after accounting for volatility clustering, there 
is a January effect in the Prague stock exchange. However, due to the significant 
autocorrelation in the residuals, the results are inadequate. None of the remaining 
indices exhibit any January/monthly effects in the returns. 
 
Table 9. GARCH (1,1) regression results of the January/monthly effect. Coefficients are reported in each 
cell as percentages and the z-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are 
denoted as *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Variable PX BUX KCLI WIG FTSE/JSE SA KOSPI 
Mean 
equation 
C 0.10 (2.43)** 0.10 (1.77)* 0.01 (0.23) 0.08 (1.50) 0.07 (1.66)* 0.01 (0.33) 
Feb -0.05 (-0.70) -0.11 (-1.43) 0.05 (1.10) -0.07 (-0.87) 0.00 (0.08) 0.04 (0.63) 
Mar -0.08 (-1.26) -0.05 (-0.52) 0.03 (0.56) -0.04 (-0.48) -0.04 (-0.60) 0.05 (0.76) 
Apr -0.06 (-0.89) 0.06 (0.63) 0.03 (0.69) -0.02 (-0.23) 0.03 (0.38) 0.07 (1.13) 
May -0.14 (-2.13)** -0.03 (-0.35) -0.01 (-0.18) -0.11 (-1.40) -0.07 (-1.16) 0.01 (0.08) 
Jun -0.16 (-2.41)** -0.12 (-1.32) 0.01 (0.26) -0.11 (-1.30) -0.07 (-1.01) -0.02 (-0.25) 
Jul 0.02 (0.37) -0.05 (-0.49) 0.05 (1.02) 0.02 (0.23) 0.05 (0.77) 0.07 (1.16) 
Aug -0.07 (-1.23) -0.06 (-0.75) -0.01 (-0.13) -0.04 (-0.50) -0.05 (-0.79) -0.04 (-0.61) 
Sep -0.07 (-1.14) -0.07 (-0.80) -0.02 (-0.36) -0.02 (-0.22) -0.03 (-0.42) 0.10 (1.50) 
Oct -0.05 (-0.68) -0.01 (-0.16) 0.04 (0.75) -0.06 (-0.81) 0.06 (0.87) -0.03 (-0.44) 
Nov -0.10 (-1.48) -0.05 (-0.58) -0.07 (1.45) -0.06 (-0.80) -0.04 (-0.72) 0.03 (0.46) 
Dec -0.02 (-0.35) 0.00 (0.02) 0.08 (1.77) -0.01 (-0.12) 0.06 (0.88) 0.09 (1.31) 
AR(1)  - 10 (5.62)*** - - - 
MA(1) 1.68 (1.96)** 4.0 (2.34)**  7.3 (4.29)*** - - 












































































LQB (1) 3.80 0.36 0.41 0.84 1.26 0.79 
LQB (2) 3.80* 2.07 0.43 1.90 1.26 2.44 
LQB (3) 4.00 3.25 1.37 2.75 1.69 3.02 
LQB (4) 5.11 5.08 2.54 3.19 1.71 3.86 
LQB (5) 5.61 5.40 4.76 3.48 2.78 5.68 
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6.3 EGARCH (1,1) -results   
Table 10 reports the EGARCH regression regarding the turn-of-the-month effect. The 
turn-of-the-month variable for Prague, Budapest, and Malaysian Exchanges remains 
statistically significant. Additionally, no significant autocorrelation is detected based 
on the Ljung-Box Q-statistic at any lags, and no significant heteroscedasticity remains, 
except for the Warsaw stock exchange. The GARCH term is very close to unity and 
highly statistically significant for every index, meaning that the conditional volatility 
is highly persistent. Since the asymmetry term is negative and statistically significant, 
it corresponds to bad news increasing volatility more than the good news of the same 
magnitude. This suggest that there is a clear leverage effect for every stock index 
returns. 
 
Table 10. EGARCH regression results of the turn-of-the-month effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell 
as percentages and the z-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted 
as *, ** and *** respectively. 
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Log likelihood 12725.02 11724.09 14436.62 12466.46 12669.92 12579.97 
ARCH (F-stat) 5 lags 0.73 1.13 1.07  2.14* 1.53 1.40 
ARCH (Prob) 5 lags 0.60 0.34 0.37 0.06 0.18 0.22 
LQB (1) 1.64 0.30 0.19 0.01 1.49 0.62 
LQB (2) 1.64 1.81 0.37 1.43 1.53 2.41 
LQB (3) 2.48 2.60 0.91 1.91 2.09 3.02 
LQB (4) 4.49 4.38 2.24 2.22 2.09 3.73 
LQB (5) 5.72 4.52 4.25 2.43 3.13 4.67 
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Table 11 reports EGARCH regression results for the day-of-the-week effect. The 
Prague Stock Exchange does not exhibit a positive Monday effect as asymmetry 
disturbances are captured. However, the difference between the Monday and Tuesday 
average return is statistically significant and negative, indicating a negative Tuesday 
effect. Otherwise, the results in the mean equation are like those of the standard 
GARCH (1,1) model. The variance equation exhibits persistent conditional volatility 
and significant asymmetry in the shocks. Thus, bad news on a particular day of the 
week has a more substantial impact on volatility than good news. Apart from the 
Warsaw stock exchange, no significant autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity remain. 
 
Table 11. EGARCH regression results of the day-of-the-week effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell as 
percentages and the z-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted as 
*, ** and *** respectively 
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Log likelihood 12723.10 11723.29 14437.05 12468.52 12671.37 12583.61 
ARCH (F-stat) 5 lags 0.71 1.14 1.07      2.21** 1.46 1.64 
ARCH (Prob) 5 lags 0.62 0.34 0.38  0.05 0.20 0.15 
LQB (1) 0.88 0.45 0.05 0.01 1.84 0.71 
LQB (2) 0.88 2.02 0.26 1.32 1.87 2.65 
LQB (3) 1.56 2.72 0.70 1.77 2.38 3.44 
LQB (4) 3.44 4.75 2.17 2.08 2.38 4.16 
LQB (5) 4.25 5.07 4.30 2.23 3.60 5.12 
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As can be seen from Table 12, the January/monthly effect results have not changed 
after estimating the model with EGARCH specifications. The Prague Stock Exchange 
still exhibits a significantly positive January effect. The differences between June, 
May, and November average returns and mean January returns are significant at the 1 
percent significance level. This suggests that once the asymmetry in volatility has been 
captured, the index exhibits significantly negative May, June, and November effects. 
The residual diagnostics report no serial correlation in the residuals. Moreover, 
heteroscedasticity is significant at the 10 percent level in the Warsaw exchange. 
 
Table 12. EGARCH regression results of the January/monthly effect. Coefficients are reported in each cell 
as percentages and the z-ratios are below in parentheses. 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance levels are denoted 
as *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Variable PX BUX KCLI WIG FTSE/JSE SA KOSPI 
Mean 
equation 
C 0.09 (2.19)** 0.08 (1.52) 0.03 (0.61) 0.09 (1.50) 0.03 (0.84) 0.00 (0.11) 
Feb -0.03 (-0.41) -0.08 (-0.81) 0.01 (0.11) -0.01 (-0.10) 0.02 (0.27) 0.01 (0.17) 
Mar -0.08 (-1.49) -0.13 (-1.45) -0.02 (-0.30) -0.11 (-1.32) -0.05 (-0.99) 0.00 (0.05) 
Apr -0.06 (-1.00) 0.08 (0.92) 0.01 (0.24) -0.05 (-0.66) 0.05 (0.96) 0.08 (1.46) 
May -0.18 (-3.04)*** -0.05 (-0.62) -0.04 (-0.70) -0.12 (-1.46) -0.05 (-0.93) 0.01 (0.14) 
Jun -0.17 (-2.67)*** -0.14 (-1.77)* -0.06 (-1.07) -0.14 (-1.84)* -0.07 (-1.28) -0.02 (-0.38) 
Jul 0.01 (0.22) -0.06 (-0.87) 0.01 (0.20) 0.02 (0.27) 0.03 (0.51) 0.07 (1.11) 
Aug -0.06 (-1.16) -0.07 (-0.89) -0.03 (-0.50) -0.05 (-0.56) -0.02 (-0.37) -0.06 (-0.98) 
Sep -0.08 (-1.33) -0.12 (-1.57) -0.10 (-1.69)* -0.08 (-1.06) -0.05 (-0.85) 0.08 (1.33) 
Oct -0.04 (-0.65) -0.01 (-0.18) 0.00 (-0.02) -0.09 (-1.22) 0.04 (0.61) -0.05 (-0.73) 
Nov -0.14 (-2.32)** -0.08 (-1.03) -0.09 (-1.57) -0.14 (-1.73) -0.04 (-0.73) -0.01 (0.76) 
Dec -0.02 (-0.30) -0.03 (-0.37) 0.07 (1.27) -0.03 (1.27) 0.04 (0.76) 0.04 (0.64) 
AR(1)   10.2 (5.87)***    
MA(1) 3.30 (2.09)** 3.8 (2.27)**  8.16 (4.92)***   





























































Log likelihood 12730.55 11723.9 14446.21 12472 12674.56 12584.8 
ARCH F-stat 0.61 1.08 0.96  2.04* 1.51 1.32 
ARCH (Prob) 0.69 0.36 0.44 0.06 0.18 0.25 
LQB (1) 1.01 0.53 0.37 0.02 1.35 0.49 
LQB (2) 1.14 2.23 0.46 1.33 1.35 1.71 
LQB (3) 1.48 3.18 1.04 1.72 1.64 2.11 
LQB (4) 2.51 4.79 2.23 2.02 1.71 3.14 
LQB (5) 3.16 5.09 4.57 2.24 3.09 4.37 
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In summary to the GARCH (1,1) models, a significant turn-of-the-month effect exists 
in the Prague, Budapest, and Malaysian Exchanges. Furthermore, a significant positive 
Monday effect is present in the Prague Stock Exchange, Warsaw Stock Exchange, and 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Additionally, a positive Tuesday and Friday effect 
occurs in the Malaysian Exchange. By contrast, the Johannesburg Exchange exhibits 
a negative Tuesday effect while the Korea Exchange exhibits a positive Tuesday 
effect. Significant autocorrelation remains in Prague Exchange, and there is 
considerable heteroskedasticity in the Warsaw exchange. In all other indices, no 
significant autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity remain.  
Moreover, a well-specified model should have normally distributed standardized 
residuals. The variance specifications do not fulfill the normality target because there 
is still excess kurtosis and negative skewness. Therefore, all three calendar anomalies 
are estimated with the EGARCH model. The results are consistent with the standard 
GARCH (1,1) model since the significant turn-of-the-month, day-of-the-week, 
January/monthly effects remain after capturing asymmetries in volatility. Only the 
positive Monday effect in the Prague exchange has disappeared, and the return on 
Tuesday is negative and significant. Since the log-likelihood is more remarkable for 
every index in the EGARCH model, it accounts for the dynamics of volatility to a 
greater extent than the standard GARCH model. Furthermore, the EGARCH model is 
better in eradicating autocorrelation in the residuals of Prague exchange returns. 
However, significant heteroskedasticity remains in the Warsaw exchange when testing 







This thesis examines the existence of three well-known calendar anomalies in six 
emerging market stock exchanges. The three calendar anomalies under examination 
are the January/monthly, turn-of-the-month, and day-of-the-week. The sample period 
was taken from January 2005 through December 2020, covering significant economic 
shocks and a steady period of market upturn. The anomalies under examination are 
tested with four different models to find as adequate results as possible. Because 
modeling calendar anomalies commonly involves only daily stock returns and 
seasonal dummy variables, it is crucial to conduct different estimation techniques to 
explain several essential features of financial data, especially volatility dynamics. This 
provides investors with information about the time-varying risks associated with 
calendar anomalies. 
OLS regression results show the turn-of-the-month effect in Prague, Budapest, and 
Malaysian stock exchanges. The reasons for the significant-high returns at the end of 
the month may be due to the regular payment dates in these countries, where investors 
receive salaries, dividends, and interest payments at month-ends and invest these in 
stocks (Ogden, 1990). Since the cash flows of many investment funds increase towards 
the end of the month because of the monthly income received by investors, the 
improved liquidity position causes relatively high demand for many securities. (Ritter, 
1988, Ziemba, 1989). The day-of-the-week effect is strongly found in the Malyasian 
exchange, in which significantly low returns occur on Monday and significantly high 
returns on Friday. This might indicate a lower investor mood at the beginning of the 
week than at the end of the week. This study finds no January/monthly effects based 
on the OLS regression results. 
After running the OLS regressions, the data generating process is reviewed with 
diagnostic tests to identify possible autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and non-
normality in the residuals. Based on the diagnostic test results, volatility clustering and 
autocorrelation is strongly observed, and therefore all three calendar anomalies are 
estimated with GARCH (1,1) models. In addition, since the asymmetric volatility tests 
report sign and size biases and the residuals exhibit significant non-normality, the 
regressions are estimated with the EGARCH model. 
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The outcomes from the GARCH models show that shocks to conditional volatility will 
be highly persistent. The asymmetric GARCH models indicate significant leverage 
effects in the conditional volatility, meaning that bad news results in greater volatility 
than the good news of the same magnitude. The standard GARCH (1,1) model implies 
a positive January effect and negative May and June effects in the Prague exchange. 
The GARCH models show that turn-of-the-month effect is still significant in Prague, 
Budapest, and Malaysian stock exchanges. In addition, significantly positive Monday 
returns occur in Prague, Warsaw, and Johannesburg stock exchanges. 
Correspondingly, a negative Tuesday effect is found in the Johannesburg stock 
exchange and positive Tuesday effects in the Korean and Malaysian stock exchanges. 
The positive Friday effect remains in the Malaysian stock exchange. The EGARCH 
model shows positive January and May, June, November effects in the Prague 
exchange. The turn-of-the-month effect is still significant in Prague, Budapest, and 
Malaysian exchanges. The positive Monday effect in the Prague exchange has 
disappeared, but there is still a negative Tuesday effect. 
Since there is a great amount of variation in the results of different estimation models, 
no clear generalization can be made of the existence of the anomalies. However, the 
turn-of-the-month effect is still relatively dominant because the results are similar in 
all models. The January/monthly and day-of-the-week effects show mixed results, and 
these anomalies are very sensitive to the model-building process. The common 
features of financial data can be incorporated by applying non-linear and asymmetric 
models and thus relaxing the assumptions of linear structural models. However, these 
models have different characteristics, and their application should be carefully 
considered as market dynamics vary from country to country. Thus, this study faces 
limitations based on the relatively small sample of emerging market indices as well as 
the exclusion of variables that might have significant explanatory power. 
Another limitation of the study is the use of capitalization-weighted index data only. 
Because some calendar effects are related to firm size, this study does not explain the 
relationships between calendar effects and company properties. However, since the 
purpose of this study is to examine calendar anomalies more broadly, the more careful 
investigation should have been restricted to only one stock market or one calendar 
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anomaly. Nonetheless, this study has systematically investigated three calendar 
anomalies using several methods to assess their existence's reliability critically. 
Although the field of research for these anomalies is vast and has a long history, their 
existence or disappearance should be examined at regular intervals under dynamic 
market conditions. Moreover, the research among emerging markets compared to 
developed markets is still relatively limited due to a lack of data and less improved 
financial integration. Thus, this study seeks to provide more information about these 
calendar anomalies and the time-series properties of the emerging market stock 
returns. Further research ought to examine the presence of calendar anomalies using 
firm or industry sector data. Additionally, following Gregoriou et al. (2004), possible 
other studies should investigate whether these anomalies appear after accounting for 
transaction costs. To my knowledge, the effects of transaction costs on the appearance 
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